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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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No. 90-1596
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F. DALE ROBERTSON, CHIEF, UNITED STATES
FOREST SERVICE, et al., PETITIONERS v.
SEATTLE AUDUBON SOCIETY et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the ninth circuit
[March 25, 1992]

  Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court.
  In this case we must determine the operation of 318 of
the Department of the Interior and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act, 1990.
                            I
  This case arises out of two challenges to the Federal
Government's continuing efforts to allow the harvesting and
sale of timber from old-growth forests in the Pacific North-
west.  These forests are home to the northern spotted owl,
a bird listed as threatened under the Endangered Species
Act of 1973, 16 U. S. C. 1531 et seq. (1988 ed. and Supp.
II), since June 1990.  See 55 Fed. Reg. 26114.  Harvesting
the forests, say environmentalists, would kill the owls.
Restrictions on harvesting, respond local timber industries,
would devastate the region's economy.
  Petitioner Robertson is Chief of the United States Forest
Service, which manages 13 national forests in Oregon and
Washington known to contain the northern spotted owl.  In
1988, the Service amended its regional guide to prohibit
timber harvesting on certain designated areas within those
forests.  Respondent Seattle Audubon Society (joined by
various other environmental groups) and the Washington
Contract Loggers Association (joined by various other
industry groups) filed separate lawsuits in the District
Court for the Western District of Washington, complaining
respectively that the amendment afforded the owl either too
little protection, or too much.  Seattle Audubon alleged
violations of three federal statutes: the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act (MBTA), 40 Stat. 755, ch. 28, as amended, 16
U. S. C. 703 et seq. (1988 ed. and Supp. II); the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 83 Stat. 852, as
amended, 42 U. S. C. 4321 et seq.; and the National Forest
Management Act of 1976 (NFMA), 90 Stat. 2949, as
amended, 16 U. S. C. 1600 et seq.  The District Court
consolidated the actions and preliminarily enjoined 163
proposed timber sales.  Seattle Audubon Soc. v. Robertson,
No. 89-160 (WD Wash., Mar. 24, 1989).
  Petitioner Lujan is Secretary of the Department of the
Interior.  The Bureau of Land Management (BLM), an
agency within the Department, manages several old-growth
forests in western Oregon.  Between 1979 and 1983, the
BLM developed timber management plans that permitted
harvesting on some areas within these forests, and prohibit-
ed it on others.  In 1987, the BLM and the Oregon Depart-
ment of Fish and Wildlife executed an agreement that
expanded the areas on which harvesting was prohibited.
Also in 1987, respondent Portland Audubon Society (among
others) filed suit in the District Court for the District of
Oregon, challenging certain proposed harvesting under four
federal statutes: MBTA; NEPA; the Federal Land Policy
and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA), 90 Stat. 2744, as
amended, 43 U. S. C. 1701 et seq.; and the Oregon-Cal-
ifornia Railroad Land Grant Act (OCLA), 50 Stat. 874, 43
U. S. C. 1181a.  Twice, the District Court dismissed the
action.  Twice before reversing (on grounds not relevant
here), the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit enjoined
some of the challenged harvesting pending appeal.  See
Portland Audubon Soc. v. Lujan, 884 F. 2d 1233, 1234
(1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1026 (1990); Portland
Audubon Soc. v. Hodel, 866 F. 2d 302, 304, cert. denied sub
nom. Northwest Forest Resource Council v. Portland
Audubon Soc., 492 U.S. 911 (1989).
  In response to this ongoing litigation, Congress enacted
318 of the Department of the Interior and Related Agen-
cies Appropriations Act, 1990, 103 Stat. 745, popularly
known as the Northwest Timber Compromise.  The Com-
promise established a comprehensive set of rules to govern
harvesting within a geographically and temporally limited
domain.  By its terms, it applied only to ``the thirteen
national forests in Oregon and Washington and [BLM]
districts in western Oregon known to contain northern
spotted owls.''  318(i).  It expired automatically on Septem-
ber 30, 1990, the last day of Fiscal Year 1990, except that
timber sales offered under 318 were to remain subject to
its terms for the duration of the applicable sales contracts.
318(k).
  The Compromise both required harvesting and expanded
harvesting restrictions.  Subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) re-
quired the Forest Service and the BLM respectively to offer
for sale specified quantities of timber from the affected
lands before the end of Fiscal Year 1990.  On the other
hand, subsections (b)(3) and (b)(5) prohibited harvesting
altogether from various designated areas within those
lands, expanding the applicable administrative prohibitions
and then codifying them for the remainder of the fiscal
year.  In addition, subsections (b)(1), (b)(2) and (b)(4)
specified general environmental criteria to govern the
selection of harvesting sites by the Forest Service.  Subsec-
tion (g)(1) provided for limited, expedited judicial review of
individual timber sales offered under 318.
  This controversy centers around the first sentence of
subsection (b)(6)(A), which stated in part:
      ``[T]he Congress hereby determines and directs that
    management of areas according to subsections (b)(3)
    and (b)(5) of this section on the thirteen national
    forests in Oregon and Washington and Bureau of Land
    Management lands in western Oregon known to
    contain northern spotted owls is adequate consideration
    for the purpose of meeting the statutory requirements
    that are the basis for the consolidated cases captioned
    Seattle Audubon Society et al., v. F. Dale Robertson,
    Civil No. 89-160 and Washington Contract Loggers
    Assoc. et al., v. F. Dale Robertson, Civil No. 89-99
    (order granting preliminary injunction) and the case
    Portland Audubon Society et al., v. Manuel Lujan, Jr.,
    Civil No. 87-1160-FR.''
Subsection (b)(6)(A) also declined to pass upon ``the legal
and factual adequacy'' of the administrative documents
produced by the 1988 Forest Service amendment and the
1987 BLM agreement.
  After 318 was enacted, both the Seattle Audubon and
Portland Audubon defendants sought dismissal, arguing
that the provision had temporarily superseded all statutes
on which the plaintiffs' challenges had been based.  The
plaintiffs resisted on the ground that the first sentence of
subsection (b)(6)(A), because it purported to direct the
results in two pending cases, violated Article III.  In Seattle
Audubon, the District Court held that subsection (b)(6)(A)
``can and must be read as a temporary modification of the
environmental laws.''  Seattle Audubon Soc. v. Robertson,
No. 89-160 (WD Wash., Nov. 14, 1989).  Under that con-
struction, the court upheld the provision as constitutional
and therefore vacated its preliminary injunction.  Nonethe-
less, the court retained jurisdiction to determine whether
the challenged harvesting would violate 318 (if done in
Fiscal Year 1990) or other provisions (if done later).  In
Portland Audubon, the District Court likewise upheld
subsection (b)(6)(A), but dismissed the action entirely
(without prejudice to future challenges arising after Fiscal
Year 1990).  Portland Audubon Soc. v. Lujan, No. 87-1160
(Ore., Dec. 21, 1989).
  The Ninth Circuit consolidated the ensuing appeals and
reversed.  914 F. 2d 1311 (1990).  The court held that the
first sentence of 318(b)(6)(A) ``does not, by its plain
language, repeal or amend the environmental laws underly-
ing this litigation,'' but rather ``directs the court to reach a
specific result and make certain factual findings under
existing law in connection with two [pending] cases.''  Id.,
at 1316.  Given that interpretation, the court held the
provision unconstitutional under United States v. Klein, 13
Wall. 128 (1872), which it construed as prohibiting Con-
gress from ``direct[ing] . . . a particular decision in a case,
without repealing or amending the law underlying the
litigation.''  914 F. 2d, at 1315.  The Ninth Circuit distin-
guished this Court's decision in Pennsylvania v. Wheeling
& Belmont Bridge Co., 18 How. 421 (1856), which it
construed as permitting Congress to ``amend or repeal any
law, even for the purpose of ending pending litigation.''  914
F. 2d, at 1315 (emphasis in original).
  On remand, the plaintiffs renewed their original claims.
In Seattle Audubon, the District Court enjoined under
NFMA 16 timber sales offered by the Forest Service during
Fiscal Year 1990 in order to meet its harvesting quota
under 318(a)(1).  See Seattle Audubon Soc. v. Robertson,
No. 89-160 (WD Wash., Dec. 18, 1990, and May 24, 1991).
While the District Court proceedings were ongoing, the
agencies jointly sought review of the Ninth Circuit's
judgment that the first sentence of subsection (b)(6)(A) was
unconstitutional.  We granted certiorari, 501 U.S. ___
(1991), and now reverse.
                           II
  The first sentence of subsection (b)(6)(A) provided that
``management of areas according to subsections (b)(3) and
(b)(5) . . . is adequate consideration for the purpose of
meeting the statutory requirements that are the basis for
[Seattle Audubon] and [Portland Audubon].''  The Ninth
Circuit held that this language did not ``amend'' any
previously existing ``laws,'' but rather ``direct[ed]'' certain
``factual findings'' and ``specific result[s]'' under those laws.
914 F. 2d, at 1316.  Petitioners interpret the provision
differently.  They argue that subsection (b)(6)(A) replaced
the legal standards underlying the two original challenges
with those set forth in subsections (b)(3) and (b)(5), without
directing particular applications under either the old or the
new standards.  We agree.
  We describe the operation of subsection (b)(6)(A) by
example.  The plaintiffs in both cases alleged violations of
MBTA 2, 16 U. S. C. 703, which makes it unlawful to
``kill'' or ``take'' any ``migratory bird.''  Before the Compro-
mise was enacted, the courts adjudicating these MBTA
claims were obliged to determine whether the challenged
harvesting would ``kill'' or ``take'' any northern spotted owl,
within the meaning of 2.  Subsection (b)(6)(A), however,
raised the question whether the harvesting would violate
different prohibitions-those described in subsections (b)(3)
and (b)(5).  If not, then the harvesting would constitute
``management . . . according to'' subsections (b)(3) and (b)(5),
and would therefore be deemed to ``mee[t]'' MBTA 2
regardless of whether or not it would cause an otherwise
prohibited killing or taking.  Thus under subsection
(b)(6)(A), the agencies could satisfy their MBTA obligations
in either of two ways:  by managing their lands so as
neither to ``kill'' nor ``take'' any northern spotted owl within
the meaning of 2, or by managing their lands so as not to
violate the prohibitions of subsections (b)(3) and (b)(5).
Subsection (b)(6)(A) operated identically as well upon all
provisions of NEPA, NFMA, FLPMA and OCLA that formed
``the basis for'' the original lawsuits.
  We conclude that subsection (b)(6)(A) compelled changes
in law, not findings or results under old law.  Before
subsection (b)(6)(A) was enacted, the original claims would
fail only if the challenged harvesting violated none of five
old provisions.  Under subsection (b)(6)(A), by contrast,
those same claims would fail if the harvesting violated
neither of two new provisions.  Its operation, we think,
modified the old provisions.  Moreover, we find nothing in
subsection (b)(6)(A) that purported to direct any particular
findings of fact or applications of law, old or new, to fact.
For challenges to sales offered before or after Fiscal Year
1990, subsection (b)(6)(A) expressly reserved judgment upon
``the legal and factual adequacy'' of the administrative
documents authorizing the sales.  For challenges to sales
offered during Fiscal Year 1990, subsection (g)(1) expressly
provided for judicial determination of the lawfulness of
those sales.  Section 318 did not instruct the courts whether
any particular timber sales would violate subsections (b)(3)
and (b)(5), just as the MBTA, for example, does not instruct
the courts whether particular sales would ``kill'' or ``take''
any northern spotted owl.  Indeed, 318 could not instruct
that any particular BLM timber sales were lawful under
the new standards, because subsection (b)(5) incorporated
by reference the harvesting prohibitions imposed by a BLM
agreement not yet in existence when the Compromise was
enacted.  See n.1, supra.
  Respondents cite three textual features of subsection
(b)(6)(A) in support of their conclusion that the provision
failed to supply new law, but directed results under old law.
First, they emphasize the imperative tone of the provision,
by which Congress ``determine[d] and direct[ed]'' that
compliance with two new provisions would constitute
compliance with five old ones.  Respondents argue that
``Congress was directing the subsection [only] at the courts.''
Brief for Respondents Seattle Audubon Soc. et al. 34.
Petitioners, for their part, construe the subsection as ``a
directive [only] to the Forest Service and BLM.''  Brief for
Petitioners 30.  We think that neither characterization is
entirely correct.  A statutory directive binds both the
executive officials who administer the statute and the
judges who apply it in particular cases-even if (as is
usually the case) Congress fails to preface its directive with
an empty phrase like ``Congress . . . directs that.''  Here, we
fail to see how inclusion of the ``Congress . . . directs that''
preface undermines our conclusion that what Congress
directed-to agencies and courts alike-was a change in
law, not specific results under old law.
  Second, respondents argue that subsection (b)(6)(A) did
not modify old requirements because it deemed compliance
with new requirements to ``mee[t]'' the old requirements.
We fail to appreciate the significance of this observation.
Congress might have modified MBTA directly, for example,
in order to impose a new obligation of complying either with
the current 2 or with subsections (b)(3) and (b)(5).
Instead, Congress enacted an entirely separate statute
deeming compliance with subsections (b)(3) and (b)(5) to
constitute compliance with 2-a ``modification'' of the
MBTA, we conclude, through operation of the canon that
specific provisions qualify general ones, see, e.g., Simpson
v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 15 (1978).  As explained above,
each formulation would have produced an identical task for
a court adjudicating the MBTA claims-determining either
that the challenged harvesting did not violate 2 as current-
ly written or that it did not violate subsections (b)(3) and
(b)(5).
  Finally, respondents emphasize that subsection (b)(6)(A)
explicitly made reference to pending cases identified by
name and caption number.  The reference to Seattle
Audubon and Portland Audubon, however, served only to
identify the five ``statutory requirements that are the basis
for'' those cases-namely, pertinent provisions of MBTA,
NEPA, NFMA, FLPMA and OCLA.  Subsection (b)(6)(A)
named two pending cases in order to identify five statutory
provisions.  To the extent that subsection (b)(6)(A) affected
the adjudication of the cases, it did so by effectively
modifiying the provisions at issue in those cases.
  In the alternative, the Ninth Circuit held that subsection
(b)(6)(A) ``could not'' effect an implied modification of
substantive law because it was embedded in an appropria-
tions measure.  See 914 F. 2d, at 1317.  This reasoning
contains several errors.  First, although repeals by implica-
tion are especially disfavored in the appropriations context,
see, e.g., TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 190 (1978), Congress
nonetheless may amend substantive law in an appropria-
tions statute, as long as it does so clearly.  See, e.g., United
States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 222 (1980).  Second, because
subsection (b)(6)(A) provided by its terms that compliance
with certain new law constituted compliance with certain
old law, the intent to modify was not only clear, but
express.  Third, having determined that subsection (b)(6)(A)
would be unconstitutional unless it modified previously
existing law, the court then became obliged to impose that
``saving interpretation,'' 914 F. 2d, at 1317, as long as it was
a ``possible'' one.  See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937) (``[A]s between two possible
interpretations of a statute, by one of which it would be
unconstitutional and by the other valid, our plain duty is to
adopt that which will save the act'').
  We have no occasion to address any broad question of
Article III jurisprudence.  The Court of Appeals held that
subsection (b)(6)(A) was unconstitutional under Klein
because it directed decisions in pending cases without
amending any law.  Because we conclude that subsection
(b)(6)(A) did amend applicable law, we need not consider
whether this reading of Klein is correct.  The Court of
Appeals stated additionally that a statute would be consti-
tutional under Wheeling Bridge if it did amend law.
Respondents' amicus Public Citizen challenges this proposi-
tion.  It contends that even a change in law, prospectively
applied, would be unconstitutional if the change swept no
more broadly, or little more broadly, than the range of
applications at issue in the pending cases.  This alternative
theory was neither raised below nor squarely considered by
the Court of Appeals nor advanced by respondents in this
Court.  Accordingly, we decline to address it here.  The
judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case
is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.

It is so ordered.